Introduction
1. In this paper I want to tackle two kinds of ethical issue that have been raised by critics of the costeffectiveness approach. The first is whether costeffectiveness analysis per se is unethical when applied to medical care. The second concentrates on particular assumptions that are usually made within costeffectiveness studies. I will deal with each issue in turn.
Is cost-effectiveness analysis unethical per se?
2. Many clinicians disapprove of the introduction of economic considerations into priority-setting in medicine, believing that letting costs 9. But before tackling either of those questions, I must make clear the context within which these questions get posed. In a health-care system guided by market forces (for example willingness-and-ability-topay on the demand side, and profit-seeking on the supply side) there need be no ideological unease about who gets the benefits or who bears the costs, provided that the distribution of purchasing power, and the distribution of market power, are both considered ethically acceptable. No health-care system I know of works wholly on that basis, however, and many, including the British National Health Service (NHS), have explicitly rejected it in principle (though it persists to a limited extent in practice). An egalitarian stance pervades these alternative systems, though as we shall see shortly this egalitarian stance is not sufficiently well specified to offer clear guidance to analysts as to what the distributional policy of the system actually is. And within this large set of predominantly (but vaguely) egalitarian systems, are a smaller number in which it has been decided that the best way to finance them is by taxation (and usually by taxes levied centrally by the national government). In what follows I shall assume that this is the kind of system we are considering.
10. So let us return to the first issue, which was whether the reduction of so-called 'indirect costs' should be counted amongst the benefits of a treatment in a cost-effectiveness analysis (ignoring here any technical difficulties that might arise in trying to do so). additional levy specifically earmarked for the NHS, because it is well known that the NHS is the one public service for which the majority of the population would be prepared to pay more taxes. The question then arises as to whether we care about the incidence of this extra taxation. It would be argued that since we are committed to ignoring the distribution of benefits between the rich and the poor, we should ignore the distribution of costs in the same way. Or we could imbibe the pure milk of the Communist manifesto and say that the guiding principle is 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need', where 'ability' here refers to ability to pay. The classic alternative taxation principle is that taxes should be proportional to benefits. This is an issue which could become quite hot in the near future, and which could greatly complicate the conduct of cost-effectiveness studies, whichever way we turn.
Are particular assumptions unethical? The measurement of benefits 16 . It is in the area of benefit measurement that I have encountered the most intense ethical objections to the cost-effectiveness approach. They vary from quite sweeping denials of the right of anyone to sit in judgement on the value of another person's life, to more specific accusations of ageism, racism, sexism, etc. The criticisms seem to reach a particularly high pitch ofexcitement when the quality-adjusted-life-year (or QALY) is used as the measure of effectiveness in cost-effectiveness studies.
17. I will not spend much time here on the alleged immorality of one person making judgements about the value of another person's life (or, more correctly, on the value of improvements in another person's health). I think such judgements are inescapable in a system which is expected to behave in a non-capricious manner in discriminating between the well and the ill, between the severely ill and the slightly ill, and between those likely to benefit from a particular treatment and those unlikely to do so, in order that some systematic priority-setting can take place in the face of inescapable resource constraints. The supposedly more ethical alternative of making these decisions by lottery certainly has the advantage of irresponsibility (if indeed that is an advantage), but seems to me quite inhuman and uncaring, and most people I have spoken to about it find it quite unacceptable. But I think it has a serious internal contradiction which flaws it fatally, which is that lotteries do not spring fully formed from Heaven. They are invented by people. These people have to decide who is eligible to enter this lottery, what the prizes are, how soon and how often you can re-enter the lottery if you fail to win the first time, whether 'tickets' (especially winning tickets) can be traded or given away, and so on. It seems to me to be the beginning of a new discussion about discrimination, which merely takes the place of the old one, but does not get us off that particular ethical hook. Having accepted the inescapability of such judgements, what is of more practical interest is an examination of the ethical implications of those judgements.
18. The first general point that has to be made is that every effectiveness measure implies some value judgement. These frequently go unrecognised, because the effectiveness measure has come to be so widely used that it is conventionally accepted as the appropriate technical way of doing things. The results surprised me. There was a very clear consensus that the most important time to be healthy was when bringing up children, which is a time in people's lives when they are in fact usually quite healthy, but which is obviously also a time when people feel extremely vulnerable if they are not healthy. Running a close second was when you are an infant, the reason usually given here being that a healthy start in life is a good investment for the future. All other life stages were far behind these two in importance.
22. I later tried out a somewhat different approach, asking a convenience sample ofsome 80 people on what grounds they thought the NHS should discriminate between different sorts of people when determining priorities. The largest single group (40 per cent of respondents) thought there should be no discrimination whatever. In the other 60 per cent the preferred bases of discrimination were according to whether people had or had not cared for their own health (which was particularly prominent amongst doctors and health-service managers), next in importance being a preference for the young. Roughly equal, in third place, were those looking after children (except amongst health-service managers!), and those looking after elderly relatives (especially amongst secretaries, who were mostly middle-aged women!) 23. A much larger survey has been carried out in Cardiff on just over 700 people selected randomly from the electoral register. They were asked to choose between people with different characteristics when treatment could only be given to one of them. The results indicated a strong preference for the young over the old, except for the very young, where an eight-yearold would be given precedence over a two-year-old. Incidentally, the older respondents also manifested this preference for the young over the old, typically adducing by way of justification the 'fair innings' principle. In addition, married people were preferred to single people, non-smokers to smokers, and light drinkers to heavy drinkers. No clear view emerged on the other dimensions tested (sex and occupation).
24. I later did a similar survey on the senior members ofan English health authority with strikingly similar results. Again the young were to be given precedence over the old, non-smokers over smokers and light drinkers over heavy drinkers. We tested in addition the dimension of having children ofschool age versus having no children, eliciting a very strong preference for the former. Again sex and occupation made no difference. These data have already convinced me that there is a very strong consensus in Britain concerning discrimination by age, by whether someone has young children, and by smoking and drinking habits. It probably influences treatment priorities almost unconsciously at local levels. But should we be taking all this into account in clinical trials and in cost-effectiveness studies? And if so, how are we to do so? At present I am sticking uneasily to a QALY is a QALY is a QALY, pending further clarification of just how much extra weight is to be given to the favoured categories over the unfavoured ones.
Conclusions
25. I hope that I have now convinced you not only that the evaluation of health-care activities is an ethical minefield, strewn with explosive material not easily detected by the naked eye, but also that bringing this material out into the open and analysing it (both by logical discourse and by empirical enquiry) is an important extension of the analyst's role. I think it is our duty to rush in where others fear to tread, even ifin the process we find ourselves being maligned as insensitive troublemakers, and even if the misguided criticize our analytical techniques because they require quite strong ethical assumptions to be made. It is not that any of these analytical techniques are ethical or unethical per se, it is more a matter of ensuring that their particular ethical assumptions are appropriate in the context in which they are being used. To do that requires us to be clear about the ethical assumptions built into our studies, but it also requires our 'clients' to be clear about what ethical assumptions are appropriate in their worlds.
I suspect that we will make faster progress with our task than they will with theirs, but perhaps it is precisely through our questioning that their position will become clearer, both to themselves and to everyone else. And with increasingly insistent demands for greater professional and political accountability in the provision of health, that must be A Good Thing! Alan Williams is Professor ofEconomics at the Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
